As far as epistemology or theory of knowledge is concerned, reality outruns the philosophical imagination. The introductory module refers to some pressing, real world epistemological problems, touches on the underlying questions in analytic, normative epistemology, and structures the MOOC.
The analysis of knowledge
Ever since Plato, philosophers have wondered what knowledge is. 'Belief' is necessary, but it's not sufficient. 'True belief' is necessary, but insufficient as well, because it doesn't rule out epistemic luck. But as Gettier demonstrated, even 'justified true belief' doesn't rule out all conceivable cases of epistemic luck. So how should we analyze knowledge?
The possibility of knowledge
Is knowledge attainable in the first place? Is knowledge within human reach? Shouldn't we be able to rule out all alternatives to know something? Or does 'enough is enough; it doesn't mean everything' apply? And if so, how does it warrant the possibility of knowledge?
The structure of knowledge
Is knowledge a pyramid, built on a large, solid foundation? Or rather a raft, with beams of wood that more or less hang together but can get adrift at sea? Or still, is it a crossword puzzle, which is not only solved by interpreting clues, but also by fitting coherently with the other words?
The kinds of knowledge
Some methods to produce beliefs, such as guessing or wishful thinking, are unreliable; more often than not, they produce false beliefs. By contrast, other methods to produce beliefs, such as perception, are reliable; they produce more true beliefs than false ones. In this module, we'll wonder whether being reliable produced in this sense suffices for a belief to be justified.
The value of knowledge
Knowledge can help to solve problems. But what role can philosophical knowledge, and more specifically epistemological knowledge, play in solving real world problems, like, e.g., truth decay? This final module discusses the heuristic and conceptual functions of epistemology, and the pivotal importance of 'contexts' in that respect.